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in countries with different factor endowments. Moreover, I shall suggest that these implications conform surprisingly well with what has been observed about patterns of cleavage and about changes in those patterns in a great variety of countries during four periods of global change in exposure to trade, namely the "long" sixteenth century, the nineteenth century, the Depression of the 1930s, and the years since World War II.
Nonetheless, what I present here remains conjectural and preliminary. The evidence I shall be able to advance is suggestive rather than conclusive. It is principally the clarity of the logical case that seems to me to justify further refinement and testing.
The Stolper-Samuelson Theorem In 1941 Wolfgang Stolper and Paul
Samuelson solved conclusively the old riddle of gains and losses from protection (or, for that matter, from free trade). They showed that in any society protection benefits-and liberalization of trade harms-owners of factors in which that society is poorly endowed, relative to the rest of the world, as well as producers who use the scarce factors intensively.1 Conversely, protection harms-and liberalization benefits-owners of factors the given society holds abundantly relative to the rest of the world, and producers who use the abundant factors intensively.2 Thus, in a society rich in labor but poor in capital, protection would benefit capital and harm labor; and liberalization of trade would benefit labor and harm capital.
So far, the theorem is what it is usually perceived to be: merely a statement, if an important and sweeping one, about the effects of tariff policy. The picture is altered, however, when one realizes that exogenous changes can have exactly the same effects as increases or decreases in protection. A cheapening of transport costs, for example, is indistinguishable in its impact from an across-the-board decrease in every affected state's tariffs (Mundell 1957, 330) ; so is any change in the international regime that decreases the risks or the transaction costs of trade. The converse is of course equally true: when a nation's external transport becomes dearer, or its trade less secure, it is affected exactly as if it had imposed a higher tariff.
The point is of more than academic interest because we know, historically, that major changes in the risks and costs of international trade have occurred: notoriously, the railroads and steamships of the nineteenth century brought drastically cheaper transportation (Landes 1969, 153-54, 196 , 201-2; Hobsbawm 1979, Chap. 3); so, in our own generation, did supertankers, cheap oil, and containerization (Rosecrance 1986, 142 ).
According to the familiar argument of Kindleberger (1973) Simple Models of the Polity and the Economy I shall assume of domestic political processes only two things: (1) that the beneficiaries of a change will try to continue and accelerate it, while the victims of the same change will endeavor to retard or to halt it; and (2) that those who enjoy a sudden increase in (actual or potential wealth and income will thereby be enabled to expand their political influence as well (cf. Becker 1983). As regards international trade, (1) implies that the gainers from any exogenous change will seek to continue and to expand free trade, while the losers will seek protection (and, if that fails, imperialism);S (2) implies that those who gain, or are positioned to gain, economically from exogenous changes in international trade will increase their political power as well.
Economically, I propose to adopt with minor refinements the traditional threefactor model-land, labor, and capitaland to assume, for now, that the landlabor ratio informs us fully about any country's endowment of those two factors. No country, in other words, can be rich both in land and in labor: a high land-labor ratio implies abundance of land and scarcity of labor; a low ratio signifies the opposite. (I shall later relax this assumption.) Finally, I shall simply define an advanced economy as one in which capital is abundant.
This model of factor endowments inevitably oversimplifies reality and will require amendment. Its present simplicity, however, permits us in theory to place any country's economy into one of four cells (see Figure 1 ), according to (1) whether it is advanced or backward and (2) whether its land-labor ratio is high or low. We recognize, in other words, only economies that are (1) capital rich, land rich, and labor poor; (2) capital rich, land poor, and labor rich; (3) capital poor, land rich, and labor poor; or (4) capital poor, land poor, and labor rich.
Political Effects of Increasing
Exposure to Trade I shall now try to demonstrate that the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem, applied to our simple model, implies that increasing exposure to trade must result in urbanrural conflict in two kinds of economies and in class conflict in the two others.
Consider first the upper right-hand cell of Figure 1 : the advanced (therefore capital-rich) economy endowed abundantly in labor but poorly in land. Expanding trade must benefit both capitalists and workers; it harms only landowners and the pastoral and agricultural enterprises that use land intensively. Both capitalists and workers-that is to say, almost the entire urban sector-should favor free trade; agriculture should on the whole be protectionist. Moreover, we expect the capitalists and the workers to try, very likely in concert, to expand their political influence. Depending on preexisting circumstances, they may seek concretely an extension of the franchise, a reapportionment of seats, a diminution in the powers of an upper house or of a gentry-based political elite, or a violent "bourgeois" revolution.
Urban-rural conflict should also arise in backward, labor-poor economies (the lower left-hand cell of Figure 1 ) when trade expands, albeit with a complete reversal of fronts. In such "frontier" societies, both capital and labor are scarce: hence both are harmed by expanding trade and will seek protection. Only land is abundant, and therefore only agri- These implications of the theory of international trade (summarized in Figure  2 ) seem clear, but do they in any way describe reality? I shall address that question more fully below, but for now it is worth observing how closely the experience of three major countries-Germany, Britain, and the United States-conforms to this analysis in the period of rapidly expanding trade in the last third of the nineteenth century; and how far it can go to explain otherwise puzzling disparities in those states' patterns of political evolution.
Germany and the United States were both still relatively backward, that is, capital-poor, societies: both, in fact, imported considerable amounts of capital in this period (Feis 1965 Britain, on the other hand, was already an advanced economy in the later nineteenth century, one in which capital was so abundant that it was exported in vast quantities (Feis 1965 , Chap. 1). That it was also rich in labor is demonstrated by its extensive exports of that factor to the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Africa.9 Britain therefore falls into the upper right-hand quadrant of Figure 1 and is predicted to exhibit a rural-urban cleavage, with fronts opposite to those found in the United States: capitalists and labor unite in support of free trade and in demands for expanded political power, while landowners and agriculture support protection and imperialism.
While this picture surely obscures important nuances, it illuminates a crucial difference between Britain and, for example, Germany in this period: in Britain, capitalists and labor did unite effectively in the Liberal party and forced an expanded suffrage and curtailment of (still principally landowning) aristocratic power; in Germany, with liberalism shattered (Sheehan 1978), the suffrage for the powerful state parliaments was actually contracted, and-far from eroding aristocratic power-the bourgeoisie grew more and more verjunkert in style and aspirations.
Political Effects of Declining Exposure to Trade
When declining hegemony or rising costs of transportation substantially constrict external trade, the gainers and losers are simply the reverse of those under increasing exposure to trade: owners of locally scarce factors prosper, owners of locally abundant ones suffer. The latter, however, can invoke no such simple remedy as protection or imperialism; aside from tentative "internationalist" efforts to restore orderly markets (Gourevitch 1986, Chap. 4), they must largely accept their fate. Power and policy, we expect, will shift in each case toward the owners and intensive users of scarce factors.
Let us first consider the situation of the highly developed (and therefore, by our earlier definition, capital-rich) economies. In an economy of this kind with a high land-labor ratio (the upper left-hand cell of Figure 1 ), we should expect intense class conflict precipitated by a newly aggressive working class. Land and capital are both abundant in such an economy; hence, under declining trade, owners of both factors (and producers who use either factor intensively) lose. Labor being the only scarce resource, workers are well positioned to reap a significant windfall from the protection that dearer or riskier trade affords; and, according to our earlier assumption, like any other benefited class they will soon try to parlay their greater economic into greater political power. Capitalists and landowners, even if they were previously at odds, will unite to oppose labor's demands.
Quite to the contrary, declining trade in an advanced economy that is labor rich and land poor (the upper right-hand cell of Figure 1 ) will entail urban-rural conflict. Capital and labor, being both abundant, are both harmed by the contraction of external trade. Agriculture, as the intense exploiter of the only scarce factor, gains significantly and quickly tries to translate its gain into greater political control.
Urban-rural conflict is also predicted for backward, land-rich countries under declining trade; but here agriculture is on the defensive. Labor and capital being both scarce, both benefit from the contraction of trade; land, as the only locally abundant factor, retreats. The urban sectors unite, in a parallel to the "radical" coalition of labor-rich developed countries under expanding trade, to demand an increased voice in the state.
Finally, in backward economies rich in labor rather than land, class conflict resumes, with labor this time on the defensive. Capital and land, as the locally scarce factors, gain from declining trade; labor, locally abundant, loses economically and is soon threatened politically.
Observe again, as a first test of the plausibility of these results-summarized in Figure 3 -how they appear to account for some prominent disparities of political response to the last precipitous decline of international trade, the Depression of the 1930s. The U.S. New Deal represented a sharp turn to the left and occasioned a significant increase in organized labor's political power. In Germany, a depression of similar depth (gauged by unemployment rates and declines in industrial production [Landes 1969 In considering these contrasting responses, should we not take into account that Argentina and Brazil were rich in land and poor in labor (recall the extent of immigration, especially into Argentina), while in Japan (and, with local exceptions, in Asia generally) labor was abundant and land was scarce (respectively, the lower left-and right-hand cells of Figure 3 )?
A Preliminary Survey of the Evidence
I want now to undertake a more systematic, if still sketchy, examination of the historical evidence that bears on the hypotheses developed here. This effort will serve principally to suggest directions for further research; it can in no way be described as conclusive. In all of these cases, as I have emphasized before, other factors were surely at work and important aspects are neglected by the present analysis; but it is essential also not to ignore the benefits and costs of expanding trade to the various sectors.
The Depression of the 1930s
Here the fit between theory and reality seems quite strong. Not only the United States but Canada, Australia, and New Zealand were by this time advanced, land-rich economies. Labor, their only scarce factor, gained from the collapse of international trade: workers became more militant, policy shifted to the left. Most Latin American societies remained landrich but backward; and for them this was quite generally the period of "Populist" coalitions of the two scarce factors, labor and capital. In developed northern Europe, owners and exploiters of the locally scarce factor of land grew more assertive, and generally more powerful, wherever previous developments had not caused them to disappear; capitalists and workers lost ground. In the developed, labor-rich and landpoor economies-including now not only most of Europe but Japan-the model would predict an "end of ideology," at least as regards issues of class: labor and capital, both beneficiaries of expanding trade, unite to advance it and to oppose any remaining pretensions to rule by the landowning groups.15 Conversely, in the land-rich and still underdeveloped economies of Latin America, expanding trade displaces the Depression-era "Populist" coalitions of labor and capital and brings renewed influence to the landed sectors. The areas of Asia and of southern Europe that are economically backward and abundant only in labor experience labor militancy and, in not a few cases, revolutionary workers' movements. Finally, and perhaps more as a statement about the future, the few economies rich in both capital and land-principally those of North America, Australia, and New Zealand-should, as they become seriously exposed to international trade, experience class conflict and a considerable suppression of labor. Capital and agriculture will for the most part unite in support of the free trade that benefits them; labor, as the locally scarce factor, will favor protection and imperialism.
Further Implications
To the extent that the model has gained any credibility from the foregoing brief survey, it may be useful to observe some of its other implications for disciplinary riddles and conjectures. Take first Gerschenkron's (1962) observation, and Hirschman's (1968) subsequent challenge and amendment of it, that "latecomers" to economic development tend to assign a stronger role to the state. From the present perspective, what should matter more, at least among labor-rich economies, is whether development precedes or follows significant exposure to trade. In an economy that has accumulated abundant capital before it is opened to trade, capital and labor will operate in relative harmony, and little state intervention will be required. Where trade precedes development, assertive labor faces-as it did in Imperial Germany-the united opposition of capitalists and landowners. To the extent that labor wins this struggle, it will require a strong state to administer the economy; to the extent that capital and land prevail, a state powerful enough to suppress labor is needed. Either route leads to a stronger state.
Even this generalization, however, applies only to economies where labor is abundant, and land scarce. Hence Hirschman's observation that "latecomers" in Latin America do not behave as Gerschenkron predicts should not surprise us. Where land is abundant, and labor scarce -as has generally been true of the' Americas-"late" economic modernization (i.e., one that follows significant exposure to trade) radicalizes owners of land rather than owners of labor. In such "frontier" economies, labor and capital again find themselves in the same political camp, this time in support of protection. If, as seems apparent, labor was scarce in the United States, then the nineteenth century's increasing exposure to trade should have depressed, or at least retarded the advance of, wages. By definition, slaves already received a lower wage than they would voluntarily accept (Else, why coerce them?); and increased trade could reasonably be seen as intensifying, or at least as retarding the demise of, slavery. Conversely, protection in a labor-scarce economy might so raise the general wage level (while, paradoxically, also increasing returns to scarce capital) as to make manumission feasible. Hence to link protection and abolition might seem a wholly sensible strategy. Moreover, because protection in that period would benefit workers and capitalists generally, it could attract the support of a very wide coalition. At least some of the mystery seems dissolved.
Relaxing the Reliance on Land-Labor Ratios
For the sake of logical completeness, and to fill a nagging empirical gap, let us now relax the assumption that the landlabor ratio informs us completely about the relative abundance of these two factors. We admit, in other words, that a country may be rich or poor in both land and labor. Four new cases arise in theory if (as I suspect) rarely in practice (see Figure 4) : economies may be, as before, advanced or backward (i.e., capital rich or capital poor); but they may now be rich in both land and labor or poorly endowed in both factors.
Two cases-that of the advanced economy rich in both factors and of the backward one poor in both-are theoretically improbable17 and politically uninteresting: if all factors were abundant relative to the rest of the world, the society would unanimously embrace free trade; if all were scarce, it would agree on protection. Let us consider, then, the remaining two possibilities.
In an advanced economy where both land and labor are scarce, expanding trade will benefit only capital. Agriculture and labor-green and red-will unite in support of protection and, if need be, imperialism; only capitalists will embrace free trade. When trade contracts in such an economy, the scarce factors of land and labor gain, and capital loses, influence; farmers and peasants are likely to seek expanded mass participation in politics and a radical curtailment of capitalist power.
In a backward economy with abundant land and labor (a possibility considered explicitly by Myint [1958, 323] Second, one can ask why the cleavages indicated here should persist. In a world of perfectly mobile factors and rational behavior, people would quickly disinvest from losing factors and enterprises (e.g., farming in Britain after 1880) and move to sectors whose auspices were more favorable. Markets should swiftly clear, and a new, if different, political equilibrium should be achieved.
To this, two answers may be given. First, in some cases trade expands or contracts so rapidly as to frustrate rational expectations. Especially in countries that experience a steady series of such exogenous shocks-Europe, for example, since 1840-divisions based on factor endowments (which ordinarily change only gradually)19 will be repeatedly revived. Second, often enough some factors' privileged access to political influence makes the extraction of rents and subsidies seem cheaper than adaptation: Prussian Junker, familiarly, sought (and, rather easily, won) protection rather than adjustment. In such circumstances, adaptation may be long delayed, sometimes with ultimately disastrous consequences.
Finally, it may be objected that I have said nothing about the outcome of these conflicts. I have not done so for the simple reason that I cannot: history makes it all too plain-as in the cases of nineteenthcentury Germany and the United Statesthat the economic losers from trade may win politically over more than the short run. What I have advanced here is a speculation about cleavages, not about outcomes. I have asserted only that those who gain from fluctuations in trade will be strengthened and emboldened politically; nothing guarantees that they will win. Victory or defeat depends, so far as I can see, on precisely those institutional and cultural factors that this perspective so resolutely ignores. 1. In fact, the effect flows backward from products and is an extension of the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem: under free trade, countries export products whose manufacture uses locally abundant, and import products whose manufacture uses locally scarce, factors intensively (cf. Leamer 1984, esp. 8-10).
Conclusion
2. Admittedly, this result depends on simplifying assumptions that are never achieved in the real world, among them perfect mobility of factors within national boundaries, a world of only two factors and two goods, and incomplete specialization. 18. There can be no doubt of Russia's abundance of land: as late as 1960, its population per square kilometer of agricultural land (35.7) was comparable to that of the United States (40.9) or Canada (28.4) and strikingly lower than those of even the more thinly populated nations of western and central Europe (e.g., France, 133; Poland, 146) (World Bank 1983). On the other hand, Myint's (1958, 323-31) insightful analysis suggests how even sparsely populated regions can have great reserves of underemployed labor under conditions of primitive markets and social structures; and he takes episodes of extremely rapid economic growth, such as the USSR exhibited in the 1930s, as putative evidence of such "surplus" labor (Myint 1958 , 323-24, 327) .
19. The chief exception to this rule arises from extensions of trade to wholly new areas with quite different factor endowments. In 1860, for example, Prussia was abundant in land relative to its trading partners; as soon as the North American plains and the Argentine pampas were opened, it ceased to be so. I am grateful to my colleague Arthur Stein for having pointed this out.
